

Before the Court is Defendants the State of Nevada ex rel. Board of Regents of the Nevada System of Higher Education on behalf of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37). Plaintiff Allison Wallace filed a Response (ECF No. 42) and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 43).

Plaintiff acknowledges that dismissal of her First Claim for Relief against UNLV for Title VII Racial discrimination is appropriate. Likewise, Plaintiff concedes that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a complete defense to her Second Claim for Relief against all Defendants in their official capacity for a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Denial of Equal Protection.

Plaintiff was admitted as a graduate student in the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (“UNLV”) Department of Science Ph.D. program in May of 2006. (Compl. ¶13, ECF No. 27.)

1 In August of 2006, the Department of Chemistry approved Plaintiff's request to enter the
2 Chemistry Ph.D. program. (*Id.*) Plaintiff was also given employment by UNLV in order to
3 assist her financially with her graduate studies and programs. (*Id.*) The UNLV Graduate
4 College contains applicable academic policies, including the policies and regulations or graduate
5 programs or departments. (MSJ, Ex. D, Academic Policies ECF No. 37-2.) It is the
6 responsibility of the students to know and observe all regulations and procedures relating to their
7 graduate program. (*Id.*) The Biological Science Ph.D. program requires three major
8 examinations which a student may be required to pass in order to complete the program:
9 Qualifying Examinations, Comprehensive or Final Examinations and an Oral Defense. (*Id.*)
10 Doctoral students are advanced to candidacy upon successful completion of all course work,
11 passing the comprehensive examination, and completing the dissertation prospectus. (*Id.*; MSJ,
12 Ex. E, Graduate College Program Change Form, ECF No. 37-2.)

13 Students are assigned an advisor at the time of admission into the Graduate College.
14 (Academic Policies.) The advisory committee, made up of the student's advisor and three
15 graduate faculty members, guides the student through the graduate program, assists the student
16 with their thesis or dissertations and administering the final examination. (*Id.*) Dr. Stephen
17 Carper became Plaintiff's advisor in the Fall of 2006. (MSJ, Ex. A, Wallace Depo. 32:7-10;
18 33:11-16.) Plaintiff also invited faculty members Dr. Ernesto Abel-Santos, Dr. Vernon Hodge,
19 and Dr. Bryan Spangelo to serve on her advisory committee. (*Id.* at 41:16-18.) Dr. Susan
20 Meacham was the Graduate College Representative assigned to assure fairness in the process.
21 (*Id.*)

22 Plaintiff completed her first year without incident. (Compl. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff passed the
23 written portion of the comprehensive exam in June 2007. (MSJ, Wallace Depo. at 46:9-17.)
24 Thereafter Plaintiff needed to prepare for her oral examination. Before the meeting for the oral
25 examination could take place in December of 2007, Dr. Carper unexpectedly passed away.

1 (Compl. at ¶ 15.) Dr. Carper's death left Plaintiff and two other master's degree students
2 without a committee chair and advisor. (*Id.* at ¶¶16-17; MSJ, Wallace Depo. at 54: 4–12.) The
3 two master's students were not African American. (*Id.*)

4 Plaintiff needed to find a new chairperson and asked Dr. Spangelo to take the position.
5 (MSJ, Wallace Depo. at 58:20–24.) Dr. Gary, another biochemistry professor was asked to
6 serve as a member on her committee after Dr. Spangelo took the role as committee chair. (*Id.* at
7 57:18–21.) Plaintiff, thereafter, had a meeting with her committee to determine her status in the
8 program. At the meeting the committee decided that Plaintiff should redo her presentation with
9 a fresh topic and they would give Plaintiff a list of topics to choose from. (*Id.* at 62:19–63:20) A
10 new topic was picked and the oral examination was scheduled for late March 2008. (*Id.* at 66:4–
11 15.)

12 The oral examination took place in March 2008 with the following individuals present:
13 Dr. Spangelo as chairperson, and Drs. Abel-Santos, Hodge, Meacham, and Gary as members.
14 (*Id.* at 67:24–68:1.) The committee did not issue a grade following Plaintiff's presentation.
15 Shortly after the oral examination Plaintiff took steps to remove Dr. Spangelo as her Chair
16 because he had allegedly made discriminatory remarks to Plaintiff. (Resp., Ex. 1, Wallace Depo.
17 84–86, 122–123, ECF No. 42–1.) Plaintiff filled out the necessary paperwork to change her
18 committee chair with the Graduate College on April 4, 2008. (*Id.* at 97–98.) Dr. Larry Tiri
19 signed the forms submitted by Plaintiff. (MSJ, Ex. K, Advisory Committee Form, ECF No. 37–
20 4.) Dr. Abel-Santos agreed to serve on the committee, but Plaintiff would be placed on
21 academic probation as a result of insufficient progress towards the degree and not advancing to
22 candidacy on two separate occasions. (MSJ, Ex. L, April 8, 2008 Letter, ECF No. 37–4.)
23 Plaintiff was placed on academic probation. It was not until May 2, 2008 that Plaintiff was
24 issued a not passing grade for her oral examination by Dr. Spangelo. (MSJ, Ex. M, May 2
25 Memo, ECF No. 37-4.) Dr. Spangelo issued this grade independent of the other members of the

1 committee. (Resp., Ex. 2, Meacham Depo. 36:12–19, ECF No. 42–2.)

2 On June 5, 2008 a memo from David Hatchett, the Chemistry Department Graduate
3 Coordinator, in conjunction with the Graduate College set forth two options regarding Plaintiff's
4 Graduate Examination Committee and advancement to candidacy. (MSJ, Ex. O, June 5 Memo,
5 ECF No. 37–5.) Plaintiff chose the second option which meant that she would start over with
6 her oral examination from the beginning but she would have an entirely new Advisory
7 Committee.

8 In August of 2008 Plaintiff started her research again. Dr. Abel-Santos resigned from the
9 committee because he felt there would be conflict due to accusations against him by Plaintiff.
10 (MSJ, Ex. S, Abel-Santos Depo. 19:17–23.) It appears that following his resignation Plaintiff
11 could not continue forward toward her degree. Plaintiff could not complete her directed
12 readings for Chem. 790 or obtain funding to continue her research and received an F in the
13 course. (Resp. Wallace Depo. at 188–190; MSJ, Ex. X, May 1 Memo, ECF No. 37–6.) Plaintiff
14 filed an appeal of this grade. Before Plaintiff received a decision on her appeal she was
15 separated from the program. In May 2009 the Graduate College notified Plaintiff of her
16 separation from the Program in the department based on Plaintiff's failure to make satisfactory
17 progress toward her degree. (*Id.*) In June 2009, the Graduate College notified her that her appeal
18 seeking reversal of her separation was denied. (MSJ, Ex. Z, June 30 Memo, ECF No. 37–6.)

19 **DISCUSSION**

20 **I. LEGAL STANDARD**

21 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the
22 pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
23 affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant

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1 is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).¹ A principal purpose of
2 summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” *Celotex Corp. v.*
3 *Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).

4 In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. “When the
5 party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come
6 forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went
7 uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing
8 the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” *C.A.R. Transp.*
9 *Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc.*, 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In
10 contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the
11 moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential
12 element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed
13 to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that
14 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. *See Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S. at 323–24. If the
15 moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court
16 need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. *See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S.
17 144, 159–60 (1970).

18 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party
19 to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. *See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith*
20 *Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
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23 ¹Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was recently amended, effective December 1, 2010. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory
24 Committee Notes, 2010 Amendments. The standard for granting summary judgment remains the same. *Id.* Amendments to
25 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern proceedings that are pending at the time the amendments become effective, as
long as the Supreme Court does not specify otherwise and the application would not be infeasible or work an injustice. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 86(a)(2). Here, to prevent against any injustice to the parties, the Court will apply the language of Rule 56 that was
in use prior to the new December 1, 2010 amendments. This earlier language was the language that was applicable when the
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed and when the Response and Reply was submitted and, therefore, would be the most
apt language to apply.

opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” *T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n*, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. *See Taylor v. List*, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. *See Celotex Corp.*, 477 U.S. at 324.

At summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. *See Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” *Id.* at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. *See id.* at 249–50.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges three causes of actions against the Defendants. Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Although Plaintiff concedes that her first claim and part of her second claims should be dismissed, Plaintiff argues that the individuals are still liable for a violation of Section 1983 denial of equal protection in their individual capacity under claim two. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants are still liable under her third claim for a violation of Title VI by intentionally discriminating against Plaintiff.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Denial of Equal Protection against Individual Defendants

The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. *City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center*, 473 U.S. 432, 439; 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the

1 Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted
2 with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a
3 protected class. *Lee v. City of Los Angeles*, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 1988).

4 Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual
5 capacities. Qualified immunity protects state officials from civil liability for damages resulting
6 from discretionary acts, so long as those acts do not violate clearly established statutory or
7 constitutional rights. *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982).
8 Qualified immunity under federal law is not merely a defense to liability; it is “an entitlement
9 not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” *Saucier v. Katz*, 533 U.S. 194, 200,
10 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001)(quoting *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985)).
11 Analyzing whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity involves two
12 questions: (1) whether the facts alleged show the official violated a constitutional right; and
13 (2) whether the right was clearly established such that a reasonable government official would
14 know the conduct was unlawful. *Saucier v. Katz*, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (overruled on other
15 grounds by *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).

16 Plaintiff tries to avoid summary judgment by arguing that she can prove discrimination
17 by showing departures from procedural norms, a history of discrimination against others
18 similarly situated or circumstantial evidence, such as a pattern of conduct inexplicable on
19 grounds other than race. *Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.*, 429
20 U.S. 252, 265-266; 97 S.Ct. 555, 563-564 (1977). Plaintiff summarizes a study done by a
21 Harvard Law Professor to support her claim that the UNLV faculty acted with a discriminatory
22 attitude toward her. Plaintiff appears to be arguing that she can prove intent to discriminate
23 based on the collective actions of the individual defendants. However, that is not the standard.
24 Because Plaintiff is suing the defendants in their individual capacities she must provide specific
25 evidence that each defendant, through their own actions, personally violated a constitutional

1 right of the Plaintiff.

2 The Court will now examine the evidence provided by Plaintiff to determine if there is a
3 material issue regarding each individual's intent or purpose to discriminate.

4 1. Dr. Spangelo

5 Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Spangelo made derogatory racial remarks to her. Plaintiff claims
6 that the remarks he made like "we have to be careful about who we give our degrees to in terms
7 of people like you" and that he referred to her as "presumptuous and uppity" and "arrogant."
8 (Reps., Wallace Depo. at 85:16–86:8; 123:8–124:17.) In May of 2008 Dr. Spangelo sent a
9 memo to the committee summarizing Plaintiff's March 28, 2008 Oral Defense and Plaintiff's
10 Advancement to Candidacy. (May 2 Memo.) The memorandum stated that Plaintiff's Oral
11 Defense of the proposal was incomplete and not passing. The other members of the committee
12 did not participate in this decision. (Meacham Depo. at 36:12–19.) Plaintiff had already
13 removed Dr. Spangelo from her committee when this memo was issued. (Resp., Wallace Depo.
14 at 84–85, 122–123.) This is the extent of actions taken by Dr. Spangelo that Plaintiff claims
15 prove that he intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff.

16 Plaintiff argues although the comments appear neutral, that she comes from the South
17 with a history of referring to African Americans who complained or did not follow the rules as
18 being "uppity nig*\$rs." If the court were to construe these comments as having racial
19 overtones, isolated comments are not sufficient to establish a violation of the Fourteenth
20 Amendment. *See, e.g., Elmahdi v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc.*, 339 F.3d 645, 653 (8th Cir.
21 2003) (to satisfy high threshold of actionable harm, a plaintiff in an action under 42 U.S.C. §
22 1981 must show that his workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
23 and insult; the mere utterance of an epithet that engenders offensive feeling in an employee will
24 not support a claim). However, in this case the comments are not isolated. Dr. Spangelo issued
25 Plaintiff a failing grade without consulting the other members of the committee. Plaintiff

1 presents evidence from Dr. Meacham who believed that Plaintiff should have passed her oral
2 examination. (Meacham Depo. at 34:7–8.)

3 The Court finds that there is a material issue of fact regarding Dr. Spangelo's actions. It
4 is reasonable to conclude that a trier of fact could draw an inference from his comments and his
5 role in giving Plaintiff a failing grade that he did such with a discriminatory intent. Therefore
6 there is a question of fact whether a reasonable person would know that making the allegedly
7 discriminatory remarks in conjunction with failing the student qualifies as racial discrimination
8 in violation of the constitution. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss Dr. Spangelo as a
9 defendant in his individual capacity.

10 2. Dr. Abel-Santos

11 Dr. Abel-Santos was an original member of Plaintiff's advisory committee. Dr. Abel-
12 Santos was part of the committee that neither passed nor failed Plaintiff but instead
13 recommended that she "complete additional items." (April 8, 2008 Letter.) Dr. Abel-Santos
14 took over as chair after Plaintiff removed Dr. Spangelo from her committee. (*Id.*) Dr. Abel-
15 Santos resigned from Plaintiff's committee in the Fall of 2008 because Plaintiff made
16 accusations against him and he felt there would be a conflict if he remained. (Abel-Santos Depo.
17 at 19:17–23.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Abel-Santos' resignation left her without the ability to
18 form an advisory committee and complete her coursework. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Abel-
19 Santos restricted the purchasing of her supplies that would prohibit her from proceeding with her
20 research and denied buying her a cell line. (Resp., Wallace Depo. at 121:19–122:1; 188-190.)

21 None of the conduct of Dr. Abel-Santos as alleged by Plaintiff establishes that Dr. Abel-
22 Santos intended to discriminate against her based on her membership in a protected class.
23 Plaintiff does not explain how Dr. Abel-Santos' conduct was a departure from procedural
24 norms, or that there was such as a pattern of conduct inexplicable on grounds other than race.
25 Accordingly the second claim against Dr. Abel-Santos in his individual capacity is dismissed.

1 3. Ms. Hall-Carper

2 Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Hall-Carper tampered with her lab supplies. (MSJ, Wallace
3 Depo. at 111:9–13; 112:14–24.) However Plaintiff supplies absolutely no evidence that suggest
4 that Ms. Hall-Carper was motivated in some way by Plaintiff’s race. Plaintiff also alleges that
5 Ms. Hall-Carper joined in a complaint against her which eventually culminated in Plaintiff’s
6 removal from the Program, but there is similarly no evidence that this was done because of a
7 racial animus toward Plaintiff. (Resp. Ex. 9 Faculty Complaint, ECF No. 42–9.) Accordingly
8 the second claim against Ms. Hall-Carper in her individual capacity is dismissed.

9 4. Dr. Hatchett

10 Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Hatchett is confusing. Regarding the actions taken by Dr.
11 Hatchett, he is alleged: (1) to have sent an e-mail stating there was no cause for Plaintiff’s
12 academic probation (Resp., Wallace Depo. at p. 220; June 5 Memo); (2) to have stated that
13 Plaintiff should leave UNLV after the death of Dr. Carper (Meacham Depo. at p. 17–18); and
14 (3) to field a retaliatory complaint against Ms. Wallace (Faculty Complaint). Plaintiff provides
15 absolutely no evidence that any of these actions by Dr. Hatchett were done to intentionally
16 discriminate against her and therefore the court dismisses the second claim against Dr. Hatchett.

17 5. Dr. Lindle

18 Dr. Lindle took over the management of funds after Dr. Carper died. (MSJ, Ex. G. Lindle
19 Depo, 14:19–23; 35:6–16, ECF No. 37–3.) Plaintiff’s original grant expired on February 27,
20 2009. Plaintiff however does not allege any conduct by Dr. Lindle that impeded Plaintiff from
21 getting new research funds. The only allegation that could support that Dr. Lindle discriminated
22 against Plaintiff is the fact that Dr. Lindle joined in the retaliatory complaint with the other
23 professors. (Faculty Complaint.) Again, there is no evidence that this retaliatory complaint was
24 done with a racial animus toward Plaintiff. The Court therefore, dismisses Plaintiff’s second
25 claim against Dr. Lindle.

1 6. Dr. Korgan

2 Dr. Korgan appears to have been the bearer of bad news with regard to Plaintiff's
3 academic program. Dr. Korgan called and informed Plaintiff of issues with the Plaintiff's
4 proposed committee members being unable to reconstitute the committee. (MSJ, Ex. V. Korgan-
5 Depo, 13:22–14:7; 24:24–25:13, ECF No. 37–6.) Dr. Korgan read a letter from Dr. Abel-Santos
6 at a meeting with Plaintiff wherein Dr. Abel-Santos resigned as chairperson, advisor, committee
7 member, and instructor, severing any and all academic commitments to Plaintiff as a student.
8 (Resp., Wallace Depo. at p.188-190.) At the meeting Dr. Korgan was instructed to find a
9 professor for the course. Dr. Korgan also denied a grade appeal by Plaintiff. (May 1 Memo.)
10 Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that would demonstrate that Dr. Korgan took any actions
11 or inactions with intent to discriminate and accordingly the Court dismisses the second claim
12 against Dr. Korgan.

13 **B. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d Claim for Intentional Discrimination**

14 Title VI provides that “no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
15 or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
16 discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C.
17 §2000d. To properly state a claim for damages under Title VI, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the
18 entity involved is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2) the entity involved is receiving
19 federal financial assistance. *Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp.*, 29 F.3d 1439, 1437 (9th
20 Cir. 1994). Title VI claims are analyzed under the same test as Title VII claims. Under Title VII
21 claims a “plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination through either the burden-
22 shifting framework set forth in *McDonnell Douglas* or with direct or circumstantial evidence of
23 discriminatory intent.” *Cohen-Breen v. Gray Television Group, Inc.*, 661 F.Supp. 2d 1158, 1165
24 (D.Nev. 2009). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination a plaintiff must demonstrate:
25 (1) membership in a protected class, (2) meeting the school's legitimate educational

1 expectations, (3) an adverse education action, and (4) worse treatment than that of similarly
2 situated students not in the protected class. *See Brewer v. Bd. of Trustees. of Univ. Illinois*,
3 479F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2007)(applying the *McDonnell Douglas* analysis to Title VI claim).
4 Under *McDonnell Douglas*, once Plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden of proof shifts to
5 the University to demonstrate that its actions were not discriminatory in nature. *Cohen-Breen*,
6 661 F.Supp. 2d at 1165. The burden would then shift to the plaintiff to show that the legitimate,
7 nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was merely pretext. *Id.*

8 There is no dispute that UNLV was the beneficiary of federal funds. Thus, Plaintiff need
9 only provide evidence that UNLV is engaging in racial discrimination to survive Defendants'
10 Motion for Summary Judgment.

11 Plaintiff does establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff, as an African
12 American woman is a member of a protected class and Plaintiff's termination from the Ph.D.
13 program constitutes an adverse education action.

14 There is evidence to show that Plaintiff was meeting the school's legitimate educational
15 expectations as she was receiving A's and B's in her courses. (Resp., Ex. 3, Abel-Santos Depo.
16 19:12–16, ECF No. 42–3.) Defendants counter with evidence that Plaintiff was not meeting
17 legitimate educational expectations. Plaintiff was responsible for submitting her proposed
18 academic committee for the Graduate school to gain approval and Plaintiff did not properly
19 submit her paper work to get approval. Plaintiff was put on academic probation due to the fact
20 that she did not pass her oral defense twice Plaintiff earned an F in Chemistry 790 because she
21 did not satisfy the academic requirements. Plaintiff failed to complete her dissertation work
22 which is necessary to earn her degree. However, all of the evidence provided by Defendants
23 that Plaintiff was not meeting the schools expectations are a result of Plaintiff's charges of
24 discriminatory intent. Plaintiff alleges that her academic trouble began when she needed to form
25 a new academic committee and present her oral defense. All the academic failings cited by the

1 Defendants arose out of the allegedly discriminatory treatment. The deposition testimony of Dr.
2 Meacham confirms that Plaintiff was treated unfairly at her oral defense as well as before and
3 after. Although the evidence may not be overwhelming, this is enough to create a material issue
4 of fact regarding whether or not Plaintiff was legitimately meeting UNLV's academic
5 expectations.

6 Finally, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff provides evidence that
7 there were similarly situated two master's students that were white that were treated more
8 favorably than her. Dr. Carper was the committee chair for both Plaintiff and the master's
9 students before his passing. All three students were placed in a situation where they needed to
10 find new committee chairs. (MSJ, Wallace Depo. at 54:2–12.) There was an overlap between the
11 professors who were on Plaintiff's committee and the master's students committees. While
12 there are different academic requirements between the Ph.D. program and the master's
13 programs, the students were similarly situated in all material respects. Dr. Meacham testified
14 that the faculty was more lenient toward these two master's students and that one of the master's
15 students was being moved forward without the necessary understanding of her project.
16 (Meacham Depo. at 49:18–25.)

17 Accordingly, Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendants
18 do not offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for her separation from the program, besides
19 the argument that she was not meeting their legitimate educational expectations. However, as
20 explained *supra* Plaintiff's coursework began to suffer after the allegedly discriminatory
21 treatment. Therefore, Defendants have not satisfied its burden to defeat Plaintiff's prima facie
22 case. Accordingly, there is a material issue of fact for trial whether Plaintiff was discriminated
23 by Defendants in violation of Title VI.

24 In addition to Plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination there is direct evidence of
25 discriminatory intent. Dr. Meacham testified that Plaintiff was treated unfairly by her

1 committee. She also claimed that there were two Nigerian, black graduate students who were
2 not going to pass and that the Chemistry Department was having trouble advancing black
3 students in their doctoral programs. (Meacham Depo. at 39:11–40:13.) According to her, four
4 out of five black students failed to advance in their careers or had been through considerable
5 remediation issues during the time period Plaintiff was having issues. (*Id.* at 40:16–22.) The
6 Court finds this to be sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent to create a genuine issue of
7 material fact for trial.

8 CONCLUSION

9 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Defendants the State of Nevada ex rel. Board of
10 Regents of the Nevada System of Higher Education on behalf of the University of Nevada, Las
11 Vegas, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37) is **GRANTED in part** and
12 **DENIED in part**.

13 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for Title VII Racial
14 Discrimination is **DISMISSED**.

15 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action against UNLV
16 and the individual Defendants in their official capacity for a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
17 Denial of Equal Protection is **DISMISSED**.

18 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action against the
19 individual Defendants in their personal capacity is **DISMISSED against all individuals, except**
20 **Dr. Spangelo**.

21 DATED this 30th day of September, 2011.

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25 Gloria M. Navarro
United States District Judge